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“The future of employment-based insurance is one of the most important is-
sues in health care reform.” BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767,
THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY IS-
SUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 11 (2008).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, unlike in all other advanced industrial
states,1 health care is financed principally through employment-based
health insurance.2  In 2009, more than 156 million individuals under
the age of sixty-five, or 59% of that population, were covered by em-
ployment-based health insurance.3
On March 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).4  Described as seminal as the
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),5
PPACA fundamentally reforms the American health care system.
PPACA, however, does not eliminate the system’s reliance on employ-
ment-based health insurance.  Instead, it builds on, and arguably
1. See Jacob S. Hacker, Review Article: Dismantling the Health Care State?  Politi-
cal Institutions, Public Policies and the Comparative Politics of Health Reform, 34
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 693, 697 (2004) (noting that the United States is the only ad-
vanced industrial state to rely principally on voluntary employment-based health
insurance).
2. This Article will use the terms employment-based health insurance and em-
ployer-sponsored health care plans interchangeably even though many employer-
sponsored health care plans are self-funded. Cf. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. &
HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2010 ANNUAL
SURVEY 154–56 (2010) (noting that slightly over one-half of workers covered by an
employer-sponsored health care plan are in a self-funded health plan) [hereinaf-
ter KAISER 2010 SURVEY].
3. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March 2010 Current Population Survey, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 347 (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2010, at
4.  In contrast, 21.1% of that population was covered by public programs, and
6.3% purchased insurance directly from an insurer. Id.  Almost 19% of the under-
65 population was uninsured. Id.  For individuals aged 65 and over, Medicare is
the principal source of health insurance. Id.  In 2009, just over 36 million indi-
viduals aged 65 or over, or 93.5% of that population, was covered by Medicare.
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 79 tbl.C-3 (2010).
A sizeable percentage of the population 65 and over—34%—also has employ-
ment-based coverage. Id.
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).  A week later, the President signed the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, the sidecar
reconciliation bill that modified the PPACA.  This Article will refer to these stat-
utes together as PPACA.
5. Janet Cecelia Walthall, New Health Care Law Likely to Pose Challenges for Em-
ployers, Attorneys Say, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau of Nat’l Af-
fairs, Arlington, Va.), May 18, 2010, at 1152.
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strengthens, the employment-based system.6  This Article discusses
how PPACA is likely to affect employers’ willingness to sponsor em-
ployment-based health insurance.
The Article begins by providing a brief history of employment-
based health insurance in the United States.  It then discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of this system.  In doing so, it focuses
on four separate aspects of employment-based health insurance:  (1)
its favorable tax treatment, (2) its cost, (3) the fact that the employer
acts as an agent for its employees when it purchases health insurance,
and (4) the labor incentives it creates.  The Article then turns to the
three incentives PPACA creates with respect to the provision of em-
ployment-based health insurance:  (1) the large employer “pay-or-
play” mandate, (2) the small employer tax credit, and (3) the excise tax
on so-called “Cadillac” plans.  It describes and discusses how each of
these incentives is likely to affect employers’ willingness to offer em-
ployment-based health insurance.  It concludes that, at least in the
short run, PPACA is unlikely to change the American health care sys-
tem’s reliance on employment-based health insurance.
II. GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED
HEALTH INSURANCE7
The current system of employment-based health insurance is often
described as the result of historical accident.8  Prior to World War II,
6. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and
HCERA: Contingent, Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls, in 2010
N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7-1, 7-3 (2010) (stating
that PPACA and HCERA “build upon—indeed, extend—the existing system of
private health insurance and employer-provided health care”); cf. DOUGLAS
HOLTZ-EAKIN & CAMERON SMITH, AM. ACTION FORUM, LABOR MARKETS AND
HEALTH CARE REFORM:  NEW RESULTS 2 (2010), available at http://www.heart-
land.org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/27712.pdf (noting that “[p]roponents of the
PPACA insisted that a key tenet was to build on this system of employer-spon-
sored coverage”).
7. For a detailed discussion of the origins and evolution of employment-based health
insurance, see COMM. ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, INST. OF MED.,
EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 49–86 (Marilyn J.
Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993).
8. See, e.g., Susan Adler Channick, Will Americans Embrace Single-Payer Health
Insurance: The Intractable Barriers of Inertia, Free Market, and Culture, 28 LAW
& INEQ. 1, 33–34 (2010); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employ-
ment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001);
Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977–1998: The Accidental System
Under Scrutiny, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 62, 63 (1999); Jeffrey Ralph Pettit, Help!
We’ve Fallen and We Can’t Get Up:  The Problems Families Face Because of Em-
ployment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L. REV. 779, 784 (1993). But see Wil-
liam S. Custer et al., Why We Should Keep the Employment-Based Health
Insurance System, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 115, 120 (1999) (“The employment-based
health insurance system is not a historical accident.  Its characteristics flow di-
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some employers offered health insurance to their workers and their
families, but these employers were the exception, rather than the
rule.9  According to one estimate, about four million Americans, or ap-
proximately 3% of the U.S. population, had employment-based cover-
age in 1930.10
Employment-based health insurance began to grow rapidly during
World War II and is now the principal source of health insurance for
most individuals.  Commentators often attribute the growth of em-
ployment-based health insurance to two principal factors: (1) wage
and price controls instituted during World War II and (2) its favorable
tax treatment.11  In addition, unions and the military’s return to civil-
ian life are also thought to have played a role in the development of
employment-based health insurance.12
rectly from our society’s desire to maximize access to health care, our commit-
ment to voluntary private markets, and the market advantages of employer-
sponsored health insurance.”).
9. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.
10. Id.; see also COMM. ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 7, at 66
(“Nationwide, by 1930, plans sponsored by employers, employees or both covered
only an estimated 1.2 million employees and 1 to 2 million dependents.”) (citation
omitted).  The medical profession vehemently opposed the practice and sought to
limit the spread of such arrangements.  Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.  Or-
ganized medicine opposed these early “independent plans” because they “ ‘tied’
physicians to contract rather than to fee-for-service practice and ‘tied’ patients to
particular physicians.” RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH
FOR A HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY 12 (1986).
11. See, e.g., FEIN, supra note 10, at 21–22; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based
Health Insurance: A Balance Sheet, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 124, 124 (1999);
Jonathan Gruber, The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15766, 2010); David A. Hy-
man, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Health Reform a “Game Changer?”
(Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE10-010, June 2010); cf. Melissa A.
Thomasson, The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S.
Health Insurance, 93 AM. ECON. R. 1373, 1373 (2003) (crediting development of
employment-based health insurance to wage and price controls, favorable tax
treatment, and insurance companies’ ability to counter adverse selection by sell-
ing to employees groups). But see BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767,
THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY ISSUES
REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 10 (2008).  Specifically, Lyke contends:
The historical argument about the importance of tax and regulatory poli-
cies may be overstated.  Enrollment in group plans expanded steadily
from 1939 onwards, starting prior to the tax ruling and regulatory
changes mentioned above and increasing roughly in tandem with in-
creases in enrollments in individual policies.  If employment-based in-
surance supplanted individual market coverage, it was not evident at
the time.
Id. (citation omitted).
12. Some commentators offer additional explanations for the growth of employment-
based health insurance.  For example, Jacob Hacker attributes the rise of em-
ployment-based insurance to a range of influential groups, including doctors, hos-
pitals, insurers, and employers, who saw it as a way of achieving their goals
while simultaneously reducing the pressure for compulsory governmental insur-
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During World War II, the Office of Price Administration instituted
wage and price controls in an attempt to deal with inflation.13  Ex-
cluded from the definition of wages, however, were fringe benefits,
such as employer contributions to health insurance and pension
funds.14  As a result, employers sought to compete for scarce labor by
enhancing their fringe benefits and offering employees health insur-
ance and pension benefits.15  “Health insurance offered a straightfor-
ward way for employers to sweeten their compensation package in a
manner that would be quite appealing to potential employees.”16
Employment-based health insurance has long been accorded
favorable tax treatment.17  In an August 26, 1943, ruling, the Internal
Revenue Service declared that the premiums employers paid on group
health and accident insurance policies were excludable from the in-
come of such employees.18  Employers, however, were still entitled to
deduct the premiums as ordinary and necessary business expenses
and were not required to include the premiums in wages for employ-
ment tax purposes.19  As the marginal tax rates during World War II
ance. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (2002).  Alain
Enthoven and Victor Fuchs contend that the survival of employment-based
health insurance in recent decades has depended upon the existence of Medicare
and Medicaid.  Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R. Fuchs, Employment-Based Health
Insurance: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1538, 1540–41 (2006).
As critics of employment-based health insurance, Enthoven and Fuchs believe
that Medicare and Medicaid have forestalled the adoption of national health in-
surance. Id.  Had Medicare and Medicaid not been adopted, they argue, more
than 25% of the population, rather than the current 16% or so, would be unin-
sured, and this would cause intense pressure to replace the current system of
employment-based insurance with national health insurance. Id.
13. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.
14. See The Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-729, § 10, 56 Stat. 765, 768.  Al-
though fringe benefits were exempted from the wage and price controls, the ex-
emption was limited; employers could only raise fringe benefits up to 5% of total
payroll. See KIP SULLIVAN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND
HOW WE’LL GET OUT OF IT 15 (2006).
15. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.
16. Id.
17. For a discussion of the tax treatment of employer-based health insurance prior to
1954, see LYKE, supra note 11, at 7–8; Comment, Employer Health or Accident
Plans: Taxfree Protection and Proceeds, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 277, 279–80 & n.8
(1954); Comment, Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and
Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222 (1954).
18. See Employer Health or Accident Plans: Taxfree Protection and Proceeds, supra
note 17, at 279–80 & n.8.  The exception, however, did not apply to premiums
paid on individual policies or to group policies which contained a savings feature.
Id. at 279–80.
19. FEIN, supra note 10, at 22; Hyman, supra note 11, at 7.
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could be as high as 85%, the real cost of a dollar of health insurance
premiums could be as low as fifteen cents for the employer.20
The 1943 ruling was withdrawn in 1953,21 but it was quickly re-
placed with a statutory exemption in 1954.22  Since 1954, section 106
of the Internal Revenue Code has excluded employer-provided health
insurance from employees’ income,23 and section 105 has excluded
benefits received under employer-provided accident and health
plans.24  In contrast, individuals who purchase health insurance on
their own must pay for the insurance with after-tax dollars.  Individ-
ual medical care expenses are only deductible if they exceed 7.5% of
annual adjusted gross income, and only the amount that exceeds 7.5%
of annual adjusted gross income is deductible.25  Although employ-
ment-based benefits do not constitute taxable income to employees,
employer contributions to fund health insurance remain deductible
expenses to the employer,26 and the contributions do not constitute
20. FEIN, supra note 10, at 22.  Under standard economic theory, the cost of health
insurance is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages. See MARK V.
PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 15–16 (1997) (providing a brief state-
ment of the economic model). But see LINDA J. BLUMBERG, URBAN INST., EM-
PLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE LOW-INCOME WORKFORCE:
LIMITATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING COVERAGE 6 (2007)
(“While the best empirical evidence available indicates that, at least in large part,
employer payments are passed back to workers via reduced wages, . . . most em-
ployers do not believe this is the case.”) (citations omitted); Ellen O’Brien, Em-
ployers’ Benefits from Workers’ Health Insurance, 81 MILBANK Q. 5, 5–6 (2003)
(contending that there is little data to support the standard economic theory).
Regardless of the validity of this theory, when the wage and price controls were
in effect, workers did not bear the cost of health insurance in the form of lower
wages.  Rather, employers sought indirect ways to increase workers’ wages, and
health insurance was a permissible and nontaxable way to increase workers’
wages.
21. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.
22. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. 83-951, 68A Stat. 1, 32.
23. See LYKE, supra note 11, at 7.  Section 106(a) of the Internal Revenue Code cur-
rently provides, “Except as otherwise provided in this section, gross income of an
employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or
health plan.”  I.R.C. § 106(a) (2006). Although the wording of the provision has
changed and subsections have been added to section 106, the substance of this
provision has not changed since it was enacted in 1954.  See LYKE, supra note 11,
at 7.  Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code extends the exclusion to premi-
ums paid by employees under premium conversion plans.  I.R.C. § 125(a) (2006).
24. I.R.C. § 105(b) (2006).
25. Id. § 213(a).  In 2005, about 35% of all individual income tax returns had itemized
deductions, and of these, less than 21% of these claimed a medical expense deduc-
tion, which accounted for about 7% of all tax returns.  See LYKE, supra note 11, at
18.  The self-employed may also deduct the premiums they pay for health for
themselves and for their families. See I.R.C. § 162(l) (2006).  Less than 3% of all
individual income tax returns take this deduction.  See LYKE, supra note 11, at
18.
26. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1960).
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wages for purposes of the employment tax.27  The Joint Committee on
Taxation has identified the income tax exclusion for employer contri-
butions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term
care insurance premiums28 as the single largest tax expenditure29 for
fiscal year 2009, with an estimated loss of $94.4 billion in tax revenue
in 2009 alone.30
In addition to the wage and price controls instituted during World
War II, and favorable tax treatment, unions are often cited as a factor
contributing to the growth of employment-based health insurance dur-
ing the 1940s and 1950s.31 Although initially suspicious of employ-
ment-based health insurance,32 labor unions, by the late 1940s,
aggressively bargained for health insurance.33  In industries domi-
nated by a few large companies, unions bargained for generous health
insurance benefits for their workers.34  In industries consisting of
many small employers, “unions organized industrywide labor-man-
agement health insurance plans that provided considerable cross-sub-
sidization among firms and among individual employees within firms
by charging uniform premiums regardless of expected utilization.”35
27. See I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2) (2006).  The Joint Tax Committee estimated the exclusion
reduced Social Security and Medicare taxes by about $93.5 billion in 2008. See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ROUNDTABLE ON HEALTH CARE FINANCING, JCX-
27-09, at 2 tbl.1 (2009).  The contributions are similarly exempt from the unem-
ployment tax. See I.R.C. § 3306(b)(2) (2006).
28. The exclusion for employer-provided coverage under accident and health plans
and the exclusion for benefits employees receive under employer-provided acci-
dent and health plans are viewed as a single tax expenditure.  See STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013, JCS-1-10, at 6 n.14 (2010).
29. Tax expenditures are defined as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the
Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of tax liability.” Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 41.  The tax expenditure for fiscal years 2009–2013 combined is estimated
to be $568.3 billion. Id.
31. See, e.g., COMM. ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 7, at 70; En-
thoven & Fuchs, supra note 12, at 1539–60; Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 25.
For an analysis of the role of unions in the development of health care policy, see
David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, The Struggle over Employee Benefits: The
Role of Labor in Influencing Modern Health Policy, 81 MILBANK Q. 45 (2003).
32. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-
Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1042 (1996).
33. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 26 (citing JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., AMERICA’S
HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? WHO PAYS? 44–45 (1986) and
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 310–15
(1982)).
34. Enthoven & Fuchs, supra note 12, at 1539.
35. Id. at 1539–40.
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Employers with workforces that were not unionized offered rich
health care benefits to discourage employees from joining unions.36
The return of military veterans to civilian life is also thought to
have helped enhance the growth of employment-based health insur-
ance during the 1940s and 1950s.37  During World War II, military
personnel grew accustomed to receiving government-issued health in-
surance.38  When they returned to the civilian workforce, they sought
a similar arrangement.39
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EMPLOYMENT-
BASED HEALTH INSURANCE
Although World War II and its wage and price controls are long
over, and unions are much less powerful than they once were, employ-
ment-based health insurance remains the dominant form of health in-
surance in this country.  Moreover, most employees rate health
insurance their most important and valuable employee benefit.40 Yet,
employment-based health insurance has been the subject of considera-
ble criticism.
This section provides an overview of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of employment-based health insurance and the reasons why em-
ployers voluntarily offer health insurance.  At the outset, it is
important to note that determining the advantages and disadvantages
of employment-based health insurance depends, in large part, on the
lens through which one views it.  To illustrate, relative to private, in-
dividual health insurance, administrative costs may be viewed as an
advantage of employment-based health insurance.  Relative to a sin-
gle-payer system, in contrast, administrative costs may be viewed as a
disadvantage of the employment-based system.
36. Hyman, supra note 11, at 8.
37. See Matthew, supra note 32, at 1041.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id. (citation omitted); see also FEIN, supra note 10, at 23 ( “[A]fter the war, mil-
lions of veterans who had received free medical care, and thus experienced the
remove of the financial barrier to the receipt of care, as civilians wanted the next
best thing: insured care.”).
40. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Bus. Group on Health, Most Workers Satisfied with
Health Care Benefits, National Business Group on Health Survey Finds (April 12,
2007), available at http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressrelease.cfm?ID=87
(stating that 75% of respondents in survey of 1619 workers at large U.S. firms
value their health plan as their most important benefit); see also John D. Banja,
The Improbable Future of Employment-Based Insurance, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May–Jun. 2000, at 17, 17 (“[P]olls indicate that the majority of Americans believe
health insurance is the most valuable benefit their employer provides and that
employers, not government, should be the primary providers of health insur-
ance.”) (citation omitted); O’Brien, supra note 20, at 10 (“Surveys confirm that
workers view employment-based health insurance as a very valuable benefit of
work.”).
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In providing an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of
voluntary employment-based health insurance, this section focuses on
four separate aspects of employment-based insurance: (1) its favorable
tax treatment, (2) its cost, (3) the fact that the employer acts as an
agent for its employees when purchasing insurance, and (4) the labor
incentives it creates.
A. Favorable Tax Treatment
One of the principal advantages of employment-based health in-
surance is that, as discussed above, employment-based health insur-
ance is eligible for favorable tax treatment.  The value of the tax
exemption to an individual worker depends on the worker’s marginal
tax rate, with the exemption being more valuable to a higher-income
worker with a higher marginal tax rate than to a lower-income worker
with a lower marginal tax rate.41  There is general agreement that
this favorable tax treatment encourages employers to offer health in-
surance,42 but economists disagree as to how significant a role tax
treatment plays in employers’ decisions to offer employment-based
health insurance.43
The tax preference accorded employment-based health insurance
has been subject to a great deal of criticism.  Critics contend that it is
inequitable because (1) individuals who do not have employment-
based health insurance do not benefit from the tax exclusion,44 and (2)
the tax subsidy is more valuable for higher-income workers than it is
for lower-income workers.45  In addition, critics contend that the tax
41. Gruber, supra note 11, at 21 (finding that five-sixths of the benefit of the tax
exclusion for employment-based health insurance flows to the top half of the in-
come distribution).
42. According to Melissa Thomasson, codification of the exclusion of the favorable tax
treatment in 1954 resulted in an increase in the amount of coverage obtained and
a shift from individual to group health insurance.  See Thomasson, supra note
11, at 1382.
43. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, The Impact of the Tax System on Health Insurance
Coverage, 1 INT’L J.  HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 293, 294, 302 (2001) (noting that
“there is relatively little consensus about the impact of tax subsidies on insurance
coverage,” and finding that “the firm’s decision to offer insurance is sizeably af-
fected by the tax price of insurance; the implied elasticity of firm offering with
respect to taxes is -0.7”); cf. Patricia G. Ketsche, An Analysis of the Effect of Tax
Policy on Health Insurance Purchases by Risk Group, 71 J. OF RISK & INS. 91
(2004) (finding that the probability that an individual will have employment-
based insurance is an increasing function of the tax subsidy and the marginal
effect of the subsidy is greater for high-risk individuals and is decreasing in
income).
44. See LYKE, supra note 11, at 17–18; Banja, supra note 40, at 18; Custer et al.,
supra note 8, at 117.
45. See STAN DORN, URBAN INST., CAPPING THE TAX EXCLUSION OF EMPLOYER-SPON-
SORED HEALTH INSURANCE: IS EQUITY FEASIBLE 1 (2009); LYKE, supra note 11, at
18–19; Banja, supra note 40, at 18; Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 127.
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subsidy creates an incentive to purchase too much insurance, which
distorts the health services market, causes inefficient allocation of
scarce resources, and increases health care costs.46
B. Cost
A second advantage of employment-based health insurance is that
it is typically much less expensive than health insurance individual
workers can purchase on the private market.  This lower cost can be
attributed to three separate factors.  First, administrative costs are
typically much lower for employment-based insurance than for indi-
vidual insurance.47  According to David Hyman and Mark Hall, the
largest employer groups typically have administrative costs of 5% or
less, while the administrative costs for smaller groups may reach
about 20%, and the administrative costs for individual purchasers
may exceed 30%.48  Second, through “pooling,” employment-based
health insurance avoids, or at least reduces, the problem of adverse
selection.49  Third, workers50 tend to be healthier, on average, than
non-workers,51 and thus the cost of insuring them tends to be lower.52
46. See DORN, supra note 45, at 1; LYKE, supra note 11, at 12–14; Banja, supra note
40, at 18; Custer et al., supra note 8, at 119; Paul Fronstin, Capping the Tax
Exclusion for Employment-Based Health Coverage: Implications for Employers
and Workers, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 325 (Emp. Benefit Res.
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2009, at 5.
47. See Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of Employment-Based
Health Coverage, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404, 407 (2004); O’Brien, supra note 20,
at 9; Mark Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing
the Pros and Cons, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28, 31, 33 (1999); Thomasson, supra note
11, at 1374; see also Pettit, supra note 8, at 785 (contending that employment-
based insurance “leads to substantial savings in marketing, processing, and other
administrative costs for group purchasers”).
48. Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 31.
49. See FEIN, supra note 10, at 24–25; Custer et al., supra note 8, at 117; Hyman &
Hall, supra note 8, at 31–32; O’Brien, supra note 20, at 9; Thomasson, supra note
11, at 1374.
50. Employment-based health insurance also covers some retirees. See INT’L FOUND.
OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT EMPLOYERS ARE CONSIDER-
ING 23 (2010) (noting that 39.2% of surveyed single employer plans currently offer
medical benefits to retired employees) [hereinafter IFEBP].  Retiree health insur-
ance coverage, however, is much less common than it was 10 or 20 years ago. See
KAISER 2010 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 163 ex. 11.1  (showing that proportion of
employers with 200 or more employees offering health insurance to active em-
ployees that also offer retiree health insurance declined from 66% in 1988 to 28%
in 2010).
51. To a lesser extent, workers’ dependents also tend to be healthier.  See Hyman &
Hall, supra note 8, at 32–33.
52. Id. at 33; O’Brien, supra note 20, at 9. Cf. Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 124 (not-
ing that although employer-based health insurance covers about two-thirds of the
U.S. population, it accounts for less than one-third of national health spending,
because public insurance programs cover the relative high cost populations of the
elderly, poor, and disabled).  Of course, this is not to suggest that all workers are
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Relative to private, individual health insurance, the administra-
tive costs and limited coverage of employment-based health insurance
may be viewed as advantages because they reduce the cost of employ-
ment-based insurance.  Proponents of universal health care, on the
other hand, view the administrative costs and limited coverage as dis-
advantages of employment-based health insurance.  For example,
Uwe Reinhardt has noted that the administrative costs under the
American health care system were $360 higher per capita than under
the German health care system.53  Alain Enthoven and Victor Fuchs,
strong proponents of a universal health care system,54 contend that
under the voluntary employment-based system, “[t]he need for more
than 850 health insurance companies to sell and contract with mil-
lions of employers underwriting each one, adds greatly to administra-
tive costs.”55  Enthoven and Fuchs assert that typical administrative
costs under the voluntary employment-based system are about 11%,56
compared to costs of 0.5% for the California’s Public Employees Re-
tirement System’s (CalPERS) coverage of 400,000 employees and de-
pendents through its single annual contract with Kaiser
Permanente.57
Ethicists contend that health care is a fundamental public good
that should not depend on a voluntary system.58  By its very nature,
healthy.  Indeed, a specific subset of workers, the chronically ill, imposes signifi-
cant costs on employment-based health insurance. See Elizabeth Pendo, Working
Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 453, 457 (2009) (“In a recent survey, over 56% of responding employ-
ers identified chronic health conditions as a top source of health care costs,
topped only by the aging population at 58%.”).
53. Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 128–29.  According to Reinhardt, the German health
care system is “based on private, not-for-profit sickness funds that operate within
a tight statutory framework.” Id. at 128.  For a detailed discussion of the German
public health care system, the oldest and arguably most successful public financ-
ing system in the world, see TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?  THE
THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RE-
SPONSE 235–64 (2003).
54. “The implicit standard by which we analyze job-based insurance is what we be-
lieve could be accomplished by a system of universal health insurance based on
tax-financed premium support, managed competition, and responsible consumer
choice of health plans/delivery systems, broadly resembling the Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefits (FEHB) program.”  Enthoven & Fuchs, supra note 12, at
1541.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1541 & n.8 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 1541.  According to one authority, administrative costs for Canada’s gov-
ernment-run single-payer system are about 3% of total costs. See David Pratt,
The Past, Present and Future of Health Care Reform: Can It Happen?, 40 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 767, 771 (2007) (citation omitted).
58. See Banja, supra note 40, at 17; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U. N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) at 71, Art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
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voluntary employment-based health insurance cannot and does not
cover the entire working population, let alone the entire U.S. popula-
tion.59  For example, lower-income workers are less likely to have em-
ployment-based health insurance than are higher-income workers,60
and individuals who work for small employers are less likely to have
employment-based health insurance than are individuals employed by
large firms.61  In addition, workers in certain industries, such as man-
ufacturing, professional services, and the public sector, are more likely
to have health insurance than are workers in other industries, such as
agriculture, food services, and entertainment.62  Indeed, under the
country’s voluntary employment-based health insurance system, al-
most 19% of the U.S. population under the age of 65 was uninsured in
2009.63  According to proponents of universal health care, this is a
fundamental failure of voluntary employment-based health insurance.
C. The Employer as Agent for Its Employees
A third advantage of employment-based health insurance, from the
standpoint of employees, is that employers, acting as agents for their
employees,64 can help employees avoid transaction costs in the selec-
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of . . .
sickness [and] disability . . . .”); Fazal Khan, Towards Achieving Lasting Health-
care Reform: Rethinking the American Social Contract, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73,
73–74 (2010) (contending that in order “to achieve lasting, rational, and compre-
hensive healthcare reform, a political consensus in the U.S. has to form that
healthcare is a basic fundamental right, and not merely an important legislative
concern subject to compromise among various interests”).
59. See Enthoven & Fuchs, supra note 12, at 1541–42.  Some contend that the failure
of voluntary employment-based health insurance to cover the entire working pop-
ulation is largely due to insufficient demand by workers rather than insufficient
supply. See THOMAS C. BUCHMUELLER, CALIF. HEALTHCARE FOUND., THE BUSI-
NESS CASE FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH BENEFITS: A REVIEW OF THE RELE-
VANT LITERATURE 4–5 (2000).
60. See BLUMBERG, supra note 20, at 3.
61. See id. at 4; LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PEN-
SION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 11 (2d ed. 2008).
62. See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 61, at 11.
63. See Fronstin, supra note 3, at 4.
64. “In the economic literature, an agent is defined as one acting on the behalf of
another, who is referred to as the principal.”  Pamela B. Peele et al., Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents for Their Employees?,
78 MILBANK Q. 5, 5 (2000).  Under traditional common law rules, an employer
would not qualify as an agent for its employees because the employer is not under
the direct control of its employees. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Profession-
alism: Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 370
(2001).  Nevertheless, legal commentators, as well as economists, frequently refer
to the employer as an agent, or reverse agent, in this context. See, e.g., Hyman &
Hall, supra note 8, at 26–30 (detailing the “mismatches” between employers and
employees with regard to providing employment-based health insurance). See
generally Matthew, supra note 32, at 1037–74 (using an agency model to describe
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tion of their health insurance policies.  Shopping for individual health
insurance can be time consuming because employees may be required
to assess and compare the benefits of many different plans.65  Employ-
ers assist employees by offering employees a limited choice among
plans.66  In addition, employers, acting as agents for their employees,
can aggressively bargain for discounts for their employees, effectively
advocate for employees in the case of coverage disputes, and generally
obtain more valuable coverage for the same money than employees
could on their own.67
In a focus group study of large employers in Pittsburgh and Cleve-
land, four researchers68 found that employers generally do a good job
as agents for their employees in the health insurance market.69  For
these purposes, an employer was considered to be a good agent if (1)
the employer understood its employees’ health plan preferences, (2)
the employer incorporated its employees’ preferences into its health
plan designs, and (3) employees valued their employer’s role as an
agent in purchasing health insurance benefits.70
On the other hand, the fact that employers act as agents for their
employees is sometimes viewed as a fault of employment-based health
insurance.  According to David Hyman and Mark Hall, staunch sup-
the employer’s relationship with employees in the context of an employment-
based health insurance system).
65. See O’Brien, supra note 20, at 10.  Some states, however, limit the number of
standardized benefit packages that may be sold in the individual market. See
Pauly et al., supra note 47, at 31 & n.2.
66. See KAISER 2010 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 60–61 ex. 4.1 (showing that 84% of
firms that offer health benefits only offer employees one type of plan, 14% offer
two types of plans, and only 2% offer employee three types of plans); see also
Gruber, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that employees value the ease of plan choice
and administration of employment-based health insurance). See generally Judith
R. Lave et al., Changing the Employer-Sponsored Health Plan System: The Views
of Employees in Large Firms, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 112, 114–16 (1999) (finding that
most focus group participants preferred to have some choice among plans but did
not want to go out on the market and shop for themselves.).  On the other hand,
lack of choice is sometimes said to be a disadvantage of employment-based insur-
ance. See Glied & Borzi, supra note 47, at 406; Pauly et al., supra note 47, at 31;
Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 128.
67. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 30; see also Lave et al., supra note 66, at 115
(confirming that large employers have been able to bargain aggressively to get
lower prices and do act as advocates for their employees); Peele et al., supra note
64, at 5–6 (“Analysts point out that many employees view their employer’s agency
role favorably because employers can negotiate better terms when purchasing
goods, such as health insurance and other employment benefits, than employees
can obtain on their own.”); Pettit, supra note 8, at 785 (“Group insurance pro-
motes competition among insurers because of employers’ increased ability to
evaluate potential plans and make informed decisions.”).
68. The researchers were Pamela B. Peele, Judith R. Lave, Jeanne T. Black, and
John H. Evans III.  Peele et al., supra note 64, at 5.
69. Id. at 5, 16–20.
70. Id. at 7.
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porters of employment-based health insurance, most of the problems
associated employment-based health insurance arise, at least in the-
ory,71 from the fact that employers rather than employees—the ulti-
mate consumers of health care—are responsible for making most of
the decisions with respect to coverage and cost.72  The fear is that em-
ployers, particularly in a weak economy, may be more motivated by
cost considerations than the wishes of their employees in negotiating
health care contracts.73  Indeed, a few critics contend that agency cost
problems are a significant cause of the health care crisis.74  Specifi-
cally, they contend that incentives under the voluntary employment-
based system create a zero sum game where employers and insurers
lose when employees are granted benefits.75
D. Labor Incentives
A fourth potential advantage of employment-based health insur-
ance is that it may help employers attract and retain high-quality
workers.76  To the extent that workers value employment-based
health insurance, they may be better, more productive, and more loyal
71. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 8, at 30 & n.52 (contending that agency problems
are often more theoretical than real and citing surveys and studies that show
that employers do a reasonably good job reflecting the values and preferences of
their employees).
72. See id. at 26–30; see also Matthew, supra note 32, at 1055–61 (citing a 1967 em-
pirical study by Mark Pauly and Gerald Goldstein in support of the argument
that employers have different insurance preferences and will make different in-
surance decisions than employees would make for themselves).
73. Cf. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 570
(2002) (“[A]n employer is susceptible to certain conflicts of interest when negoti-
ating a health care coverage contract for its employees.  For example, the em-
ployer may be either more or less willing to trade off price for quality than its
employees.”).
74. See John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in
the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2311–19 (2008); see also Enthoven
& Fuchs, supra note 12, at 1542 (contending that “employer insurance has helped
perpetuate the inefficiencies inherent in the fragmented, uncoordinated fee-for-
service (FFS) small-scale practice model that still accounts for most of health care
delivery”).
75. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 74, at 2308–09. But see Custer et al., supra note
8, at 119 (contending that employers as purchasers of insurance play an impor-
tant role in keeping down health care costs).
76. See BLUMBERG, supra note 20, at 2–3; O’Brien, supra note 20, at 12–16; see also
AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, CONDITION CRITICAL: TEN PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORMING
HEALTH CARE QUALITY, COST AND COVERAGE 6 (2009) (“In this system, employers
have strong incentives to offer health care coverage to recruit and retain a tal-
ented workforce to best meet their unique needs.”); Hyman, supra note 11, at 6
(“[E]mployers use [employment-based health insurance] to help them attract and
retain qualified workers, lower absenteeism, sick pay and disability costs, and
increase productivity.”).
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employees if their employers provide health insurance benefits.77  In-
deed, employers report that they believe that offering health insur-
ance has a positive impact on the overall success of their business.78
Whether employment-based health insurance leads to a better,
more productive workforce and has a positive impact on the em-
ployer’s bottom line is subject to debate.  In 2000, Thomas Buchmuel-
ler reviewed the existing literature and concluded that there was little
evidence that employment-based health insurance dramatically in-
creases worker productivity or reduces workers’ compensation costs
and employee absenteeism.79  On the other hand, Ellen O’Brien re-
viewed the literature and found some support for the proposition that
offering health insurance results in gains in worker quality and pro-
ductivity.80  Nevertheless, O’Brien recognized that there are substan-
tial gaps in the research and contended that economists should make
more of an effort to assess the relationship between health insurance
coverage and its effect on overall business success.81
On a related note, employment-based health insurance has been
criticized for distorting the labor market by encouraging employees to
remain in jobs solely to retain their health insurance, a phenomenon
referred to as “job lock.”82  Congress has enacted two laws to reduce
job lock.  The first, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (COBRA),83 requires employers with health insurance to offer
“qualified beneficiaries,”84 who would otherwise lose coverage under
the plan due to a “qualifying event,”85  the right to continue their
77. See Paul B. Ginsburg, Employment-Based Health Benefits Under Universal Cov-
erage, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 675, 677 (2008); Matthew, supra note 32, at 1044.
78. See Paul Fronstin, The Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits: Have Em-
ployers Reached a Tipping Point?, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 312
(Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2007, at 13; Paul Fronstin &
Ruth Helman, Small Employers and Health Benefits: Findings From the 2002
Small Employer Health Benefits Survey, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF
NO. 253 (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2003, at 7.
79. BUCHMUELLER, supra note 59, at 10–17.
80. O’Brien, supra note 20, at 16–28.
81. Id. at 29–35.
82. See Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 127 (”Because the employer-based system ties
health insurance to a particular job, it can induce employees to remain inden-
tured in a detested job simply because it is the sole source of affordable health
coverage.”).  For a review of the economics literature on job lock, see Jonathan
Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobil-
ity: Critical Review of the Literature, in HEALTH POLICY AND THE UNINSURED 97
(Catherine G. McLaughlin ed., 2004).
83. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82.
84. “Qualified beneficiaries” include the covered employee, the covered employee’s
spouse, and the covered employee’s dependent child.  29 U.S.C. § 1167 (2006).
85. “Qualifying events” include the death of the covered employee, the termination—
except in the case of gross misconduct—or reduction in the hours of the covered
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health coverage for a specified period of time86 by paying 102% of the
cost of coverage.87  Employees who terminate employment—whether
voluntarily or involuntarily—may generally continue coverage for up
to eighteen months.88  Although COBRA may have reduced job lock,89
it has its limitations.  First, it requires that employees pay the premi-
ums,90 and many employees find the premiums prohibitively expen-
sive.91  Second, even for those employees who can afford to pay the
premiums, coverage is only provided for a limited period of time.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA),92 the second law intended to reduce job lock,93 was enacted
in 1996.  HIPAA limits the ability of employers to limit or exclude cov-
erage for conditions that were present prior to the time the individual
enrolled in the employer’s health care plan by (1) limiting the types of
conditions that may be excluded and (2) limiting the length of time
health care plans may impose preexisting condition exclusions.  First,
HIPAA provides that unless “medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treat-
employee’s employment, and divorce or legal separation from the covered em-
ployee. Id. § 1163.
86. If the qualifying event is termination of employment, or reduction in hours, the
maximum period of continuation coverage is eighteen months. Id. § 1162(2)(A)(i).
In other cases, the maximum period is generally thirty-six months. Id.
§ 1162(A)(iv).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (2006).  After 18 months of continuation coverage, the plan
sponsor may charge up to 150% of the applicable premium. Id.
88. Id. § 1162(2)(A)(i).
89. Cf. Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and Job Mobility:
The Effects of Public Policy on Job-Lock, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 86, 95–100
(1994) (using state-wide variation in continuation coverage laws to find twelve
months of continuation coverage increased the job mobility of workers with
health insurance coverage by 10%).
90. In February 2009, Congress created a temporary program pursuant to which the
federal government agreed to pay 65% of COBRA premiums, initially for up to
nine months and later for up to fifteen months.  The program was extended three
times and ultimately expired in May 2010.  For a discussion of the program and
early evidence showing that fewer individuals than expected sought this assis-
tance, see Paul Fronstin, Examination of the Short-term Impact of the COBRA
Premium Subsidy and Characteristics of the COBRA Population, 31 EMP. BENE-
FIT RES. INST.  NOTES (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 2010, at
8. See also RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., URBAN INST., FEDERAL SUBSIDY FOR
LAID-OFF WORKERS’ HEALTH INSURANCE: A FIRST YEAR’S REPORT CARD FOR THE
NEW COBRA PREMIUM ASSISTANCE (2010) (finding that more employees claimed
COBRA benefits after subsidy enacted but noting that take-up rates vary among
different populations).
91. Pendo, supra note 52, at 460 (“[A] recent study found that although most unem-
ployed workers are eligible, fewer than one in ten extends coverage under
[COBRA].”).
92. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996).
93. Among other things, HIPAA was intended “to improve portability and continuity
of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets.” Id.
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ment was recommended or received” for a condition within six months
prior to enrollment in the new plan, the health care plan cannot treat
the condition as a preexisting condition.94  In addition, HIPAA limits
the maximum period for a preexisting exclusion to twelve months.95
HIPAA permits individuals to offset the twelve month period with any
period of prior “creditable coverage.”96  “Creditable coverage” is de-
fined broadly,97 but creditable coverage is forfeited if there is a sixty-
three day period during which the individual did not have any health
care coverage.98  Thus, HIPAA prohibits a plan from imposing any
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to any individual who has
at least twelve months of prior health care coverage, enrolls in the
new plan at the first opportunity, and did not experience a sixty-three
day lapse in coverage.  HIPAA neither requires plans to provide spe-
cific benefits nor restricts the premiums plans may charge to all par-
ticipants.99  It allows plans to establish limits or place restrictions on
the amount, extent, or level of a plan’s coverage and benefits for “simi-
larly situated individuals” in the plan.
While COBRA and HIPAA may have reduced job lock,100 they have
not entirely eliminated it.  For example, COBRA and HIPAA do not
require that employers provide retiree health insurance.101  Thus,
workers with employment-based health insurance may elect to delay
retirement until they are eligible for Medicare if their employer does
not offer retiree health insurance.102  Similarly, a worker may forgo a
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(1) (2006).  PPACA expands HIPAA’s preexisting condition ex-
clusion provisions. See PPACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (adding PHSA § 2704).
Effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, preexisting condi-
tions are defined to include preexisting conditions regardless of whether any
medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was received for the condition at
any time prior to enrollment.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.701-2 (2010); 45 C.F.R. § 144.103
(2010).
95. Id. § 1181(a)(2).  The exclusion period is extended to eighteen months for a late
enrollee. Id.
96. Id. § 1181(a)(3).
97. Id. § 1181(c)(1).
98. Id. § 1181(c)(2)(A).
99. HIPAA does prohibit a plan from charging one individual a higher premium than
the premium charged to a similarly situated individual already enrolled in the
plan on the basis of any health status related factors. Id. § 1182(b)(1).
100. But see Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano, Job-Lock and Public Policy: Clinton’s Second
Mandate, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 430, 436 (2006) (using data from the 1996
panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and finding the
impact of HIPAA on job-lock to be small and statistically insignificant).
101. COBRA requires that employers offer employees the opportunity to continue
their health insurance after retirement, but, as noted above, employees must pay
for that continuing coverage, and the continuing coverage is only available for a
limited period of time. See supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Richard W. Johnson et al., Health Insurance Costs and Early Re-
tirement Decisions, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 716 (2003) (describing studies
that show that the availability of health insurance and/or Medicare after retire-
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job change if the prospective employer does not offer health insurance,
if the prospective employer’s health coverage is inferior to the current
employer’s coverage, or if the prospective employer’s plan is more ex-
pensive than the current employer’s plan.103  Moreover, an employee
may decide not to change jobs if the prospective employer’s plan does
not provide access to the same physicians and medical facilities as
were available under the current employer’s plan.104
IV. PPACA’S IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT-BASED
HEALTH INSURANCE
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act regulates the sub-
stance of employer-provided health care plans in a number of ways.105
For example, PPACA requires any group health plan that provides
dependent coverage to continue to make that coverage available to a
child until the child turns twenty-six.106  In addition, PPACA prohib-
its group health plans from imposing annual or lifetime limits on “es-
ment affects the timing of retirement). Cf. Kanika Kapur & Jeannette Rogowski,
The Role of Health Insurance in Joint Retirement Among Married Couples, 60
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 397, 404 (2007).  Kapur and Rogowski utilized data from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to determine the effect of retiree health
insurance for wives on “joint retirement”—that is, whether husbands and wives
would retire at the same time. Id. at 397–403.  The authors found that “the pres-
ence of retiree health insurance for the wife significantly increased the
probability of joint retirement relative to the husband retiring first.  Couples in
which wives had retiree health insurance were also significantly more likely to
retire jointly than to postpone retirement.” Id. at 404.
103. In 2008, some 25% of the respondents to the Employee Benefit Research Insti-
tute’s Health Confidence Survey reported that either they or an immediate fam-
ily member had passed up another job opportunity, stayed at a job they would
otherwise have quit, or delayed retirement because of the need to retain health
insurance. See Paul Fronstin & Murray N. Ross, Addressing Health Care Market
Reform Through an Insurance Exchange: Essential Policy Components, the Public
Plan Option, and Other Issues to Consider, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF
NO. 330 (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 2009, at 19; see also
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST, THE 2001 HEALTH CONFIDENCE SURVEY SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS 7–8 (2001) (noting reasons most frequently cited for job lock are respon-
dents “could not afford health insurance on their own (28 percent) or the potential
employer did not offer health insurance (15 percent), the potential employer of-
fered fewer benefits (20 percent), and they or a family member had a medical
condition that would not be covered by a potential employer’s plan (18 percent)”).
104. See Lave et al., supra note 66, at 112–13 (“[B]ecause specific health plans are
typically not portable from company to company, changing jobs may mean losing
access to a provider and interrupting continuity of care.”).
105. For an overview of PPACA’s regulation of employment-based health insurance,
see Kurt L.P. Lawson, Provisions of Interest to Employers in the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, 64 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Bureau of
Nat’l Affairs, Arlington, Va.), Apr. 6, 2010, at 1.
106. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, § 1001(5),
124 Stat. 119, 132 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act (PHSA) § 2714, as
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA),
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sential benefits.”107  These substantive provisions are likely to affect
the number of individuals covered by employment-based health insur-
ance as well as the willingness of employers to sponsor health care
plans by increasing the cost of such plans.  Other provisions of
PPACA, such as the mandate that individuals purchase health insur-
ance or pay a penalty108 and PPACA’s subsidy for health care cover-
age for low-income individuals,109 are likely to affect the demand for
employment-based health insurance.
This section will not attempt to analyze all the ways in which
PPACA is likely to impact employment-based health insurance and
employers’ willingness to offer such plans.  Instead, it will focus on
three separate provisions of PPACA that were specifically  intended to
influence employers’ willingness to offer health insurance: (1) the
large employer “pay-or-play” mandate, (2) the small employer tax
credit, and (3) the excise tax on so-called “Cadillac” plans.  This sec-
tion describes and discusses how each of these incentives is likely to
affect employers’ willingness to offer health care plans.
A. Large Employer “Pay-or-Play” Mandate110
PPACA does not mandate that employers provide employees with
health care coverage.  Beginning in 2014, however, it imposes an ex-
cise tax on “applicable large employers” who fail to offer employment-
based health insurance.  This section begins by describing the penalty
to which employers are subject if they fail to offer coverage.  It then
discusses whether employers are likely to “pay” the penalty or “play”
by offering employment-based health insurance.
Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1082) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-14).
107. PPACA § 1001(5), 124 Stat. at 131 (adding PHSA § 2711, as amended by PPACA
§ 10101(a), 124 Stat. at 883) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11)
108. PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (adding I.R.C. § 5000A, as amended by
PPACA § 10106(b), 124 Stat. at 909, and HCERA § 1002, 124 Stat. at 1032) (to be
codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A).  At the time this Article went to press,
four district courts had rendered decisions in suits challenging the constitutional-
ity of the individual pay-or-play mandate.  Two courts upheld the mandate.  See
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30,
2010).  Two courts declared it unconstitutional. See Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida v. HHS, No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT, 2011 WL
285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  For an analysis of the Commerce Clause argu-
ments at issue in these cases, see Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to
Health Care Reform, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2011).
109. PPACA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 213 (adding I.R.C. § 36B, as amended by PPACA
§ 10105(a)–(c), 124 Stat. at 906, and HCERA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 1030) (to be
codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36).
110. This provision is sometimes referred to as a “free-rider assessment.” See, e.g.,
Helen Darling, Health Care Reform: Perspectives From Large Employers, 29
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1220, 1221 (2010).
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1. Overview of “Pay-or-Play” Mandate
PPACA imposes an excise tax on “applicable large employers” who
fail to satisfy their “shared responsibility” of offering employees the
opportunity to enroll in “minimum essential coverage”111 under an eli-
gible employer-sponsored plan.112  For these purposes, an “applicable
large employer” is generally defined as an employer113 who employed
an average of at least fifty full-time employees114 during the preced-
ing calendar year.115  Full-time employees are generally defined as
employees who perform, on average, at least thirty hours of service
per week.116
An employer may fail to meet its “shared responsibility” in one of
two ways: (1) the employer does not offer its full-time employees and
their dependents the opportunity to enroll in minimal essential cover-
age under an eligible employer-sponsored group health plan for a
month, and at least one full-time employee is certified to claim a pre-
mium assistance tax credit or cost sharing reduction,117 or (2) the em-
ployer offers its full-time employees and their dependents the
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible
111. Beginning in 2014, PPACA requires that individuals maintain “minimum essen-
tial coverage.”  PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (adding I.R.C. § 5000A(a)) (to
be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).  “Minimum essential coverage” includes coverage
under an “eligible employer-sponsored plan.”  PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 248
(adding I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(B)) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).  Eligible em-
ployer-sponsored plans include any “plan[s] or coverage offered in the small or
large group market within a State.”  PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 249 (adding
I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(2)(B)) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).
112. I.R.C. § 4980H (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253, and amended by
PPACA § 10106(e)–(f), 124 Stat. at 910, and HCERA § 1003, 124 Stat. at 1033).
113. In identifying the employer, the aggregation rules applicable to qualified plans
apply. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(C)(i) (added by PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at
254, and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).  For an overview
of the aggregation rules, see, for example, FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 61, at
423–31.
114. Seasonal employees may be disregarded for purposes of this calculation. See
I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(B) (added by PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 254, and re-des-
ignated by HCERA § 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
115. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (added by PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 254, and re-
designated by HCERA § 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
116. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A) (as added by PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 255, and
re-designated by HCERA § 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).  Solely for purposes of
determining whether an employer qualifies as a “large” employer, full-time
equivalents must be taken into account. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(E) (added by
PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 254, and amended and re-designated by HCERA
§ 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).  Full-time equivalents are calculated by adding the
total hours worked in a month by employees, other than full-time employees, and
dividing by 120. Id.  For example, if ten employees, who are not full-time employ-
ees, work a total of 240 hours per month for the employer, the employer will be
treated as having two full-time equivalents.
117. See I.R.C. § 4980H(a) (added by PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 253).
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employer-sponsored group health plan for a month, and at least one
full-time employee is certified to claim the premium assistance tax
credit or cost sharing reduction.118  Generally, an employee will be eli-
gible for a tax premium credit or cost sharing reduction for health cov-
erage purchased through the exchange if (1) the employee’s household
income is between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level and (2)
either (a) the employee is not eligible to participate in an employer
sponsored group health plan or (b) the employee is eligible to partici-
pate in such a plan, but (i) the coverage under the employer’s plan is
“unaffordable,” that is, the premium required to be paid exceeds 9.5%
of the employee’s household income, or (ii) the coverage consists of a
plan under which the plan’s share of the total allowed cost of benefits
is less than 60%.119
If an employer fails to meet its “shared responsibility” in the first
instance, by not offering coverage and having at least one employee
obtain a premium tax credit or cost sharing reduction, the employer is
subject to an excise tax for the month equal to one-twelfth of $2000, or
about $167, per full-time employee.120  Thus, if an applicable large
employer does not offer coverage to its workforce, its penalty is based
on its entire full-time workforce, although up to thirty full-time em-
ployees may be disregarded in calculating the penalty.121  The penalty
is indexed to the rate of premium growth after 2014.122
If an employer fails to meet its “shared responsibility” in the sec-
ond instance, by offering coverage and still having at least one em-
ployee obtain a premium tax credit or cost sharing reduction, the
employer is subject to an excise tax for the month equal to one-twelfth
of $3000, or about $250, per full-time employee who opts out of the
118. See I.R.C. § 4980H(b) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253, and amended
and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(b), (d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
119. See PPACA § 1401,  124 Stat. at 213 (adding I.R.C. § 36B tax credit); PPACA
§ 1402, 124 Stat. at 220 (adding cost sharing provisions); PPACA § 10105, 124
Stat. at 906 (amending §§ 1401 and 1402); HCERA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 1030
(amending §§ 1401 and 1402).  According to Mercer, most employer-sponsored
plans, other than limited medical plans, have an actuarial value greater than
60%. MERCER, HEALTH CARE REFORM: IMPACT ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS
BEGINS TO EMERGE 4 (2010).
120. See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(1) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253–54, and
amended and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(b)(2), (d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
121. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 254, and
amended and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 1033).  This is
sometimes referred to as a “sledgehammer” penalty. See David R. Godofsky, Op-
timizing Employee Benefit Costs Under PPACA: Avoid False Dichotomies, 37
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for Nat’l Affairs, Arlington, Va.), June 8,
2010, at 1322.
122. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(5) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 255, and amended
and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(b)(3), (d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
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employer’s plan and receives the credit or cost sharing reduction.123
Thus, if an applicable large employer offers coverage to its workforce,
its penalty will be based on the number of employees who opt out of
the employer plan (and receive a premium tax credit or cost sharing
reduction), rather than the employer’s entire full-time workforce.124
Moreover, the penalty is limited to the amount the employer would
owe if it did not offer any coverage,125 and it is indexed to the rate of
premium growth after 2014.126
To illustrate, suppose that an applicable large employer has sev-
enty-five full-time employees and does not offer its full-time employ-
ees and their dependents coverage under an eligible employer-
sponsored group health plan for a month.  Two full-time employees
are certified to claim a premium assistance tax credit or cost sharing
reduction.  The employer will be subject to a penalty equal to $7500
for that month.127  In contrast, if the same employer offered coverage
and the same two employees opted out, the employer would only be
subject to a penalty equal to $500.128
2. Will Employers “Pay” or “Play?”
PPACA’s pay-or-play mandate is intended to encourage “applicable
large employers” to offer affordable health care coverage to their em-
ployees.  Whether it will do so is an open question.
The penalty PPACA imposes on employers who fail to offer employ-
ees affordable health care coverage is relatively low compared with
prevailing health insurance costs.  To illustrate, in 2009, the average
annual health insurance premium in the United States was $4669 for
single coverage, $9053 to cover the employee plus one additional fam-
ily member, and $14,027 for family coverage.129  The average annual
123. See I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253, and amended
and re-designated by HCERA § 1003(b)(1), (d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
124. This is sometimes referred to as a “tack hammer” penalty. See Godofsky, supra
note 121.
125. See I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(2) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 254, and re-desig-
nated by HCERA § 1003(d), 124 Stat. at 1033).
126. See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(5) (added by PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 255, and re-desig-
nated by HCERA § 1003, 124 Stat. at 1033).
127.
1( × $2000) × (75-30) = $7500.12
128.
1( × $3000) × 2 = $500.12
129. JAMES M. BRANSCOME, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE DIFFERENCES IN THE COST OF JOB-RE-
LATED HEALTH INSURANCE 2009, at 1 (2010).
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employee contribution was $957 for single coverage, $2363 to cover
the employee plus one additional person, and $3474 for family cover-
age.130  Thus, in 2009, the annual average pre-tax cost to the em-
ployer131 of providing single coverage was $3712, while the cost to
cover the employee plus one other family member was $6690, and the
cost for family coverage was $10,553.  In contrast, if the employer fails
to offer any coverage, the annual nondeductible penalty under PPACA
is generally $2000 per worker, and if the employer offers coverage but
it is unaffordable, the annual PPACA penalty is $3000 per employee
for whom the coverage is “unaffordable.”132
Perhaps not surprisingly, most employers either plan to or already
have done modeling to determine the financial impact of health care
reform on their organization.133  For example, Caterpillar has deter-
mined that it could reduce its costs by 70% if it eliminated its health
care coverage and paid the penalties, and AT&T has calculated that
its $2.4 billion health care coverage costs would fall to just $600 mil-
lion if it simply paid the penalties.134  Indeed, the National Retail
Federation created an online tool to help retailers and other busi-
nesses determine the penalties they might face under the new pay-or-
play mandate.135
Looking at these figures, David Merritt, vice president and na-
tional policy director of the Center for Health Transformation, as-
130. Id. at 3.
131. Of course, economists would contend that the employee rather than the employer
bears the cost through reduced wages. See supra note 20 (discussing standard
economic theory).
132. See also Florence Olsen, Uncertainty Surrounds Employer Response to Insurance
Reforms, IFEBP Speakers Say, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for
Nat’l Affairs, Arlington, Va.), May 11, 2010, at 1103 (noting that, according to
Paul Fronstin of the Employee Benefit Research Institute, “[t]he weighted-aver-
age employer contribution for health insurance coverage was $8,900 in 2009,
which is more than four times the ‘pay or play’ penalty of $2,000 per full-time
employee or equivalent that employers with more than 50 employees would be
charged in 2014 for not offering health insurance under the health reform law”).
133. See TOWERS WATSON, HEALTH CARE REFORM: LOOMING FEARS MASK UNPRECE-
DENTED EMPLOYER OPPORTUNITIES TO MITIGATE COSTS, RISKS AND RESET TOTAL RE-
WARDS 3 (2010) (noting that according to a survey of more than 650 mid- to
senior-level benefit professionals, “79% of employers plan to model the financial
impact of health care reform on their organization”); see also MERCER, supra note
119, at 4 (noting that “all employers are asking how health care reform will affect
their plans and costs”).
134. See, e.g., HOLTZ–EAKIN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 3; Hyman, supra note 11, at 16
& n.38; Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch to President Barack Obama (June 14,
2010), available at 2010 WLNR 12150669.
135. Health Mandate Cost Calculator, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, http://www.nrf.com/mod-
ules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1290 (last visited May 11, 2011); see Press Release,
National Retail Federation, NFR Calculator Lets Employers Determine Potential
Penalties Under New Health Care Reform Law (May 25, 2010), available at http:/
/www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=news&op=viewlive&sp_id=934.
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serted that many companies might find eliminating health insurance
an easy way to cut costs “knowing that employees will have the oppor-
tunity to go through a government insurance exchange, and perhaps
with an insurance tax subsidy.”136  He even contended that there
might be shareholder suits against companies that do not eliminate
coverage for violating their fiduciary duty to the company; sharehold-
ers could contend that providing health insurance is not the wisest use
of the company’s funds.137  Likewise, Representative Joe Barton said
that “[f]rom a financial standpoint, from a purely economic stand-
point, many companies would be better off discontinuing health care
as a fringe benefit, paying the penalty and pocketing the savings.”138
Similarly, Leslie Norwalk, then-acting administrator for the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services under President George W. Bush,
wondered “whether or not employers will keep their current employ-
ees and dependents on insurance coverage when the penalty is so
much less than the coverage itself.”139
Of course, determining whether an employer would be better off
retaining coverage or dropping it and paying the penalty is much more
complicated than simply comparing the cost of premiums with the cost
of the penalty.140  First, the employer may deduct the cost of premi-
ums, but the penalties are nondeductible.  Second, health care cover-
age is a form of nontaxable compensation to employees, and employees
may demand higher wages if employers elect to eliminate coverage.141
136. Companies, Individuals May Find It Cheaper to Pay Fines Under Health Law,
Speaker Says, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for Nat’l Affairs, Ar-
lington, Va.), May 25, 2010, at 1201.
137. Id.
138. Robert Pear, Inquiry Says Health Care Charges Were Proper, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/business/27health.html?_r=1&scp=1&
sq=%22Inquiry%20Says%20Health%22&st=cse.
139. Sara Hansard, How Many Employers May Drop Coverage Under PPACA Isn’t
Clear, Lawyer Says, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for Nat’l Affairs,
Arlington, Va.), July 20, 2010, at 1556.  Perhaps reflecting Caterpillar’s calcula-
tions, Norwalk said, “Indications are that 70 to 75 percent of the cost of health
care could typically be saved if employers decided to pay the $2,000 per employee
penalty for not providing health insurance under [PPACA].” Id.
140. Moreover, offering or eliminating health care coverage are not the only options
employers have.  For example, they may continue to offer health insurance but
lower their costs by increasing their employees’ share of the premium. See Godof-
sky, supra note 121.
141. See HOLTZ–EAKIN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 3 (“Health insurance is only one por-
tion of the overall compensation package employees receive as a result of compet-
itive pressures.  And the evidence suggests that if one portion of that package is
reduced or eliminated—health insurance—another aspect—wages—will ulti-
mately be increased as a competitive necessity to retain and attract valuable la-
bor.”); MERCER, supra note 119, at 4.  Specifically, Mercer found:
The “savings” to an employer are not simply the difference between cur-
rent cost and the penalty.  Employees will expect some compensation ad-
justment to help them buy coverage in the individual market, and
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How much additional compensation employees would likely demand
depends, in part, on whether they would be eligible for subsidized cov-
erage under PPACA142 and their relative bargaining position in light
of the state of the economy.143  Moreover, employers offer health in-
surance for a variety of reasons,144 such as to recruit and retain a
highly-qualified workforce,145 and should take these reasons into ac-
count when determining whether to continue offering health care
coverage.146
Recent surveys suggest that most employers intend to continue of-
fering health insurance. For example, according to a Towers Watson
employers must ask if they can afford the compensation boost sufficient
to pay for high-cost individual marketed insurance.
Id.
142. According to Gary B. Kushner:
While low- and middle-income employees would receive a subsidy to
purchase coverage, the subsidy phases out as income rises, and it disap-
pears completely after $88,000 in family income.  Thus, an employee and
spouse each earning $50,000, for example, might have to pay about
$15,000 to purchase coverage through an exchange.  Presumably, there
would be significant pressure on employers not offering health benefits
to increase employees’ direct compensation to pay for that coverage.  If
paid as direct compensation, it is subject to payroll taxes and workers’
compensation costs.  In addition, any other benefit predicated on com-
pensation, such as retirement plan contributions, life insurance or disa-
bility coverage, would proportionately increase.  And after all of that, the
employer still has to pay the $2,000 penalty.
Gary B. Kushner, Now It’s Employers’ Turn: The Health Care Reform Law Will
Reshape Your Benefits Agenda, Starting This Year, HR MAG., June 1, 2010, at 34.
Taking into account the availability of subsidized coverage for workers with
family income at or below 400% of the poverty level, Douglas Holtz–Eakin and
Cameron Smith calculated that, with respect to about 43 million workers, it
would make economic sense for the employer to drop coverage if the health plan
costs the employer $11,941. HOLTZ–EAKIN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 3–4.
143. See Olsen, supra note 132, at 1103 (noting that, according to Paul Fronstin of the
Employee Benefit Research Institute, “[i]f unemployment is near 10 percent in
2014 and if state health care exchanges are viable alternatives under [PPACA],
employers might have little competitive reason to continue offering group health
care coverage”); cf. Kushner, supra note 142, at 36, 39 (noting that employers
should reconsider the role health insurance plays in the overall compensation
strategy “if unemployment levels begin to decline to historically normal levels of 6
percent and employees begin feeling more comfortable leaving a job”).
144. See Godofsky, supra note 121 (“Many employers prefer their employees to have
health insurance, for a variety of reasons, including positive effects on morale
and absenteeism, community reputation, goodwill, and moral reasons.”).
145. See supra section II.D (discussing effect of employment-based health insurance
on labor force).
146. See, e.g., Bill Mooney, Finding the Right Balance: Pain or Gain?, 86 MERCER BUS.
(Mercer Reg’l Chamber of Commerce, Trenton, N.J.), July 1, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 14542859 (theorizing that “many employers, in particular large
‘name-brand’ companies, will continue to offer health insurance because of the so-
called moral imperative and because in the end it is good business”). See gener-
ally Kushner, supra note 142 (discussing the importance of considering the role of
health benefits in the total rewards strategy).
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survey of more than 650 mid- to senior-level benefit professionals, al-
most half of surveyed employers (46%) said they would definitely con-
tinue to offer health insurance, and another 42% of employers said
they were likely to continue to offer health insurance.147  Only 3% of
employers responded that they were likely to pay the excise tax rather
than offer health insurance.148  Similarly, approximately 87% of the
1021 individuals responding to an International Foundation of Em-
ployee Benefit Plans’ survey of single employer plans reported that
their organization would “continue to offer health care benefits be-
cause they are critical to employee recruitment and retention and re-
maining competitive.”149  Indeed, Tracy Watts, a health care
specialist with Mercer, reported that Mercer has done “quite a bit of
modeling for clients over the past several months,” and “[t]here have
only been a few circumstances where it actually turns out being finan-
cially a better deal for the employer to say, you know what, we’re not
going to do this any more, we’re just going to pay the penalty.”150
Employers’ responses to the pay-or-play mandates in Massachu-
setts and San Francisco also suggest that employers may continue to
offer employment-based health insurance despite the relatively low
PPACA penalty.  Early evidence shows that in both Massachusetts
and San Francisco employers are choosing to provide health insurance
rather than pay a penalty.151  Of course, the pay-or-play mandates in
Massachusetts and San Francisco are distinguishable from the
PPACA pay-or-play mandate in a number of ways.  For example, the
Massachusetts penalty is much lower than the PPACA penalty,152
while the San Francisco penalty is arguably higher and more strin-
147. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 133, at 4.
148. Id.
149. IFEBP, supra note 50, at 33.
150. Sara Hansard, Few Companies Will Find Advantage In Dropping Health Cover-
age, Mercer Says, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for Nat’l Affairs,
Arlington, Va.), July 6, 2010, at 1530; see also Godofsky, supra note 121 (showing
how an employer that currently offers no insurance could be financially better off
offering insurance with a low subsidy than not offering insurance at all).
151. See Sharon K. Long & Paul B. Masi, How Have Employers Responded To Health
Reform In Massachusetts? Employees’ Views At The End of One Year, 27 HEALTH
AFFAIRS w576 (2008) (finding “no evidence that concerns about employers’ drop-
ping or scaling back coverage under health reform have been realized”); Carrie
Hoverman Colla et al., How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early
Evidence from San Francisco 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16179, 2010) (“There is little evidence at this time of crowd-out due to the
mandate, such as stopping offering insurance or restricting the generosity of ben-
efits for some workers.”).
152. The Massachusetts’ penalty is $295 per employee per year, which is estimated to
be less than 10% of the actual cost of providing coverage. See Jon R. Gabel et al.,
Report From Massachusetts: Employers Largely Support Health Care Reform,
and Few Signs of Crowd-Out Appear, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS w13–w14 (2008).
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gent than the PPACA penalty.153  Nevertheless, early evidence in
both Massachusetts and San Francisco show that employers are
choosing to “play” rather than “pay,” and thus these examples provide
some evidence that employers may continue to provide health insur-
ance rather than pay PPACA’s relatively low penalty.
On the other hand, comments made by smaller employers subject
to the PPACA pay-or-play mandate suggest that employers that do
not already offer health insurance may elect to pay the penalty rather
than offer health insurance.  On July 26, 2010, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the
American Action Network held a forum entitled, “Behind the Curtain:
The Health Care Law’s Impact on Small Business.”154 At the forum,
Scott Womack, president of Womack Restaurants, which owns eleven
International House of Pancakes restaurants in Indiana and Ohio, de-
clared, “We’ll absolutely be paying the penalty . . . .”155  He noted that
average profits per employee in the restaurant industry are only about
$2600 per employee and contended that the $2000 PPACA penalty156
will “devastate” the industry.157  Erik Oppenheim, vice-president of a
company that owns twenty Burger King franchises in the District of
Columbia and Maryland, said, “We would most definitely pay the pen-
alty as opposed to offering the insurance to all of our qualified employ-
ees.  It would definitely be much more cost-effective . . . .”158
Thus, based on survey data and employers’ responses to the Mas-
sachusetts and San Francisco pay-or-play mandate, it appears likely
that, at least in the short run, most employers that currently offer
health insurance will continue to offer it rather than pay the PPACA
153. In 2008, the San Francisco ordinance required employers with 20–99 employees
to spend $1.17 per hour for health care for each employee, and employers with
100 or more employees were required to spend $1.76 per hour for each employee.
See Colla et al., supra note 151, at 6.  In 2009, the amounts were increased to
$1.23 per hour for employers with 20–99 employees and $1.85 per hour for em-
ployers with 100 or more employees. Id.  Thus, each year, employers with 20–99
employees are required to spend about $2415 per employee for health care and
employers with 100 or more employees are required to spend about $3633 per
employee. Id. at 11.  Employers who do not meet the health care spending re-
quirement are required to pay the same amount directly to the city.  Peter D.
Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 94 (2009).  The city then uses the money to
fund the Health Access Program, which is designed to provide medical care to the
uninsured in San Francisco. Id. at 100.
154. Sara Hansard, Small-Business Owners Vow to Pay Fines Rather Than Buy Em-
ployee Health Insurance, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for Nat’l
Affairs, Arlington, Va.), Aug. 3, 2010, at 1679.
155. Id.
156. Womack asserted that the $2000 penalty would total about $2800 per employee
because it is not tax deductible. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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penalty.159  On the other hand, employers that do not currently offer
health insurance may elect to pay the penalty rather than offer insur-
ance.160  Moreover, if unemployment rates are high and some employ-
ers begin to drop coverage in favor of paying the penalty, other
employers that currently offer coverage may decide to pay the penalty
in lieu of offering insurance,161 and PPACA could lead to an unrav-
eling of employment-based health insurance.162
B. Tax Credit for Small Employers
While PPACA uses a “stick” approach to encourage large employ-
ers to offer health care coverage to their employees, it also employs a
“carrot” method to encourage small employers with low- and moder-
ate-income employees to provide their employees with health care cov-
erage.  Specifically, PPACA creates a small employer tax credit163
that was “designed to encourage small employers to offer health insur-
ance coverage for the first time or maintain coverage they already
have.”164
159. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimate employers will pay a
total of $87 billion in pay-or-play penalties between 2014 and 2019. RICHARD S.
FOSTER, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESTIMATED FINANCIAL EFFECTS
OF THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,” AS AMENDED tbl.1
(2010).  The CBO estimates that together uninsured individuals and employers
will pay a total of $65 billion in penalties between 2014 and 2019.  Letter from
Congressional Budget Office to Nancy Pelosi tbl.2 (March 20, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf [hereinafter
CBO].
160. A Rand Corporation study projects that the enactment of PPACA will cause the
percentage of firms with 51–100 employees that offer health insurance to in-
crease from 90% to 98%, and the percentage of firms with more than 100 employ-
ees to increase from 93% to 98%. See generally RAND CORP., HOW WILL THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AFFECT EMPLOYEE HEALTH COVERAGE AT SMALL BUSI-
NESSES?  1 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/re-
search_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9557.pdf.  The Rand study, however, does not
attribute that increase to PPACA’s employer pay-or-play penalty. See id. In-
stead, it attributes the increase to PPACA’s mandate that individuals purchase
health insurance or pay a penalty. Id.
161. Mooney, supra note 146 (noting that at an investor’s conference in New York,
“Caterpillar basically said we are prepared to drop our employee health coverage,
but we don’t want to do it, and we don’t intend to be first, but we will be quick
second”).
162. See id. (“ ‘I think the reason most of the physicians were against [the PPACA] is
that they look at it as slippery slope,’ Cinotti said.  ‘That the exchanges are going
to fail because the big employers are going to get out and then we’re going to end
up with a single-payer national system.  And that’s the real fear we have.’”).
163. I.R.C. § 45R (added by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub.
L. 111-148, § 1421(a), 124 Stat. 119, 237 (2010), and amended by PPACA
§ 10105(e)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. at 906).
164. IRS News Release IR-2010-63 (May 17, 2010).
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This section begins by describing the small employer tax credit.  It
then analyzes the credit’s likely effect on small employers’ willingness
to offer health insurance.
1. Overview of Tax Credit
In order to qualify for the tax credit, small employers must satisfy
three requirements.165  First, the employer must have fewer than
twenty-five full-time equivalent employees (FTE) for the taxable
year.166  Second, the average annual wages of the employees for the
year must be less than $50,000 per FTE.167  Third, the employer must
maintain a “qualifying arrangement” under which the employer pays
a uniform percentage of at least 50% of the premium cost of the health
coverage for each employee covered under the employer-provided in-
surance.168  Beginning in 2014, the small tax credit is only available if
the insurance is provided through a state-sponsored insurance
exchange.169
For tax years 2010 through 2013, small employers are eligible for a
tax credit of up to 35% (25% for tax-exempt employers).170  Beginning
in 2014, the full credit will increase to 50% (35% for tax-exempt em-
ployers),171 but employers will only be eligible for the credit for two
years.172  Employers with ten or fewer FTEs with average taxable
wages of $25,000 or less are eligible for the full credit.  The credit is
165. For guidance on the small employer tax credit, see IRS Notice 2010-44, I.R.B.
2010-22 (June 1, 2010).
166. I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1)(A) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).  The number
of FTEs is determined by dividing the total number of hours of service for which
wages were paid by the employer to employees during the tax year by 2080.
I.R.C. § 45R(d)(2)(A) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).  Generally,
self-employed individuals—including partners and sole proprietors, 2% share-
holders of S corporations, and 5% owners of the employer—are not treated as
employees. See I.R.C. § 45R(e)(1)(A) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at
240).  In addition, the number of hours worked by seasonal employees who do not
work more 120 days per year are not taken into account in determining FTEs.
I.R.C. § 45R(d)(5)(A) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 239).
167. I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 237, and
amended by PPACA, § 10105(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 906).  Beginning in 2014, the
$50,000 income limit will be adjusted for inflation. See I.R.C. § 45R(d)(3)(B) (ad-
ded by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 239, and amended by PPACA § 10105(e)(1),
124 Stat. at 906).
168. I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1)(C), (d)(4) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238–39).
169. Cf. I.R.C. § 45R(g)(3) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 241, and amended
by PPACA § 10105(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 906) (providing that for calendar years 2010
through 2013, arrangement will not fail to meet the requirements of § 45R(d)(4)
solely because the insurance is provided outside of an Exchange).
170. I.R.C. § 45R(g)(2)(A) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 241, and amended
by PPACA § 10105(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 906).
171. I.R.C. § 45R(b) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).
172. I.R.C. § 45R(a), (e)(2) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238, 240).
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phased out as the number of FTEs increases from 10 to 25,173 and
annual average compensation increases from $25,000 to $50,000.174
In addition, the credit is limited to the applicable percentage of “the
average premium (as determined by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services) for the small group market in the rating area in
which the employee enrolls for coverage.”175  Thus, if an employer
purchases insurance with higher than average premiums, the em-
ployer will not receive a credit with respect to premiums that exceed
the average.
Eligible small employers may take the credit in the form of a gen-
eral business credit176 and must reduce their income tax deduction for
the premiums they pay by the amount of the credit.177
2. Likely Effect
The PPACA tax credit for small businesses appears to be well-
targeted.  While small employers are generally less likely to offer
health insurance than are larger employers, very small employers are
the least likely to offer health insurance.  For example, in 2010, more
than 95% of employers with fifty or more employees offered health in-
surance to their employees, while 76% of those with ten to twenty-four
employees did, and only 59% of businesses with three to nine employ-
ees offered health insurance to their employees.178
How many employers will take advantage of the tax credit is not
clear.  Gary Kushner of Kushner & Company has lauded the tax credit
as a strong incentive to eligible small employers to begin or continue
to offer health care coverage to employees.179  Kushner, however, does
not offer an estimate of how many small employers are likely to take
advantage of the credit.  Similarly, Paula A. Calimafde, chair of the
Small Business Council of America, asserted that “providing a tax in-
centive for small businesses to begin to offer or continue to offer health
coverage will enable many to now purchase coverage for their employ-
ees.”180  Nevertheless, she noted that “[w]hether it will be enough of
173. I.R.C. § 45R(c)(1) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).
174. I.R.C. § 45R(c)(2) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).  The wage limi-
tations will be adjusted for inflation. See I.R.C. § 45R(d)(3)(B)(ii) (added by
PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 239, and amended by PPACA § 10105(e)(1), 124
Stat. at 906).
175. I.R.C. § 45R(b)(2) (added by PPACA § 1421(a), 124 Stat. at 238).
176. See I.R.C. § 38(b)(36) (added by PPACA § 1421(b), 124 Stat. at 241).
177. I.R.C. § 280C(h) (added by PPACA § 1421(d), 124 Stat. at 242).
178. KAISER 2010 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 38 ex. 2.2.  The percentage of employers
with three to nine employees that offered health insurance increased from 46% in
2009 to 59% in 2010. Id.
179. Health Care Reform: Small Employer Tax Credit, GARY KUSHNER’S BENEFITS
BLOG (May 9, 2010), http://www.kushnerco.com/blog/wordpress/?p=137.
180. See Kushner, supra note 142, at 37.
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an incentive to get small businesses into the health care delivery sys-
tem remains to be seen.”181  The IRS mailed about 4 million postcards
to small employers that might be eligible for the tax credit.182  The
IRS does not, however, have an estimate of the number of businesses
likely to take advantage of the credit.183
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that over the next
ten years, about $40 billion in tax credits will be provided to small
employers, with program expenditures reaching a maximum of $6 bil-
lion in 2013 and then stabilizing at $3 to $4 billion per year thereaf-
ter.184  The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) project
similar, though somewhat lower, figures.  Specifically, the CMS esti-
mates that $31.4 billion in tax credits will be provided to small em-
ployers between 2010 and 2019, with credits totaling $3.3 billion in
2010, $4.6 billion in 2011, $4.9 billion in 2012, $5.2 billion in 2013,
$5.7 billion in 2014, $6.2 billion in 2015, $1.6 billion in 2016, and no
credits being provided after 2016.185
In July 2010, Families USA and Small Business Majority issued a
report lauding the tax credit for small businesses.186 It asserted that
more than 4 million (4,015,300) small businesses would be eligible to
receive the tax credit in 2010, and it noted that this figure represented
almost 84% of all small businesses in the nation.187  In addition, it
pointed out that more than 90% of the small businesses in eleven
states would be eligible to receive the tax credit in 2010.188  On July
28, 2010, Senator Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of the Senate
Committee on Finance, issued a press release entitled, “Health Care
Tax Credit for Small Businesses Has Been Oversold.”189  The press
release did not acknowledge the fact that the IRS mailed out postcards
to about 4 million businesses that might be eligible for the credit.  In-
stead, it challenged the study for failing to factor in the requirement
that the employer pay at least one half of the premium in order to be
eligible for the credit.  “When that’s considered, the Congressional
181. Id.
182. IRS News Release IR-2010-48 (April 19, 2010).  An image of the postcard notice is
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/n1397.pdf.
183. See Lauren Gardner, IRS Releases Guidance on Determining Eligibility for
Small-Firm Health Care Credit, 37 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (Bureau for
Nat’l Affairs, Arlington, Va.), May 25, 2010, at 1202.
184. CBO, supra note 159, at tbl.4.
185. FOSTER, supra note 159, at tbl.1.
186. See generally FAMILIES USA & SMALL BUSINESS MAJORITY, A HELPING HAND FOR
SMALL BUSINESSES: HEALTH INSURANCE TAX CREDITS (2010), available at http://
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/Helping-Small-Businesses.pdf
[hereinafter FAMILIES USA].
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id.
189. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin.,
Health Care Tax Credit for Small Businesses Has Been Oversold (July 28, 2010).
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Budget Office estimates that only 3 million small business employees
nationwide would benefit from this tax credit in 2016.”190  The Fami-
lies USA study does, however, expressly state: “To qualify for the tax
credits, businesses must cover at least 50 percent of each employee’s
health insurance premiums.”191  It simply does not estimate the num-
ber of employers that will choose to provide health insurance to work-
ers and claim the credit.
Like Senator Grassley, the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) has criticized the Families USA study for overselling
the tax.192  The NFIB estimated that just under 2 million, or about
35% of, small businesses in the United States currently offer health
insurance,  pay more than one-half of the premium costs, and thus
qualify for the tax.193  The NFIB, however, did not estimate how many
additional employers might choose to offer health insurance in light of
the new tax credit.  Instead, it simply claimed that the relevant statis-
tic is how many employers currently qualify for the credit rather than
are eligible for the credit.
A September 2010 Commonwealth Fund report provides estimates
for the number of workers working for firms that will be eligible for
the tax credits and the number of workers in firms that will take up
the tax credit between 2010 and 2013.194  Specifically, the report
states that up to 16.6 million employees are estimated to be working
for firms that will be eligible for the small employer tax credits, while
about 3.4 million employees work in firms that will take up the tax
credit between 2010 and 2013.195  These estimates were provided by
Jonathan Gruber and Ian Perry of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology using the Gruber Microsimulation Model for the Common-
wealth Fund.196
In sum, it appears that around 4 million small businesses would be
eligible for the tax credit in 2010.  It is not entirely clear, however,
how many will claim the credit.  According to projections by the CBO,
about 3 million employers are expected to claim the credit in 2016,
while according to estimates by Jonathan Gruber and Ian Perry,
190. Id.
191. FAMILIES USA, supra note 186, at 2.
192. Press Release, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Just the Facts: Small Business Health-
care Tax Credit (July 20, 2010), available at http://www.nfib.com/nfib-on-the-
move/nfib-on-the-move-item?cmsid=52099.
193. Id.
194. SARAH R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM’S
POTENTIAL: SMALL BUSINESSES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010, at 7




196. Id. at 7 & n.13.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB410.txt unknown Seq: 33 21-JUL-11 13:01
2011] EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 917
about 3.4 million employees work for firms that will take up the credit
between 2010 and 2013.
C. Excise Tax on “Cadillac” Plans
As discussed above, employment-based health insurance is ac-
corded favorable tax treatment, principally under sections 105 and
106 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Critics of this favorable tax treat-
ment contend that, among other things, it leads to over-insurance
which distorts the health services market, causes inefficient alloca-
tions of scarce resources, and inflates health care costs.197  PPACA
creates a nondeductible excise tax on so-called “Cadillac” health care
plans,198  effective in 2018, to address this problem.199  This section
begins by describing the Cadillac tax.  It then discusses the likely ef-
fect of the tax on employers’ willingness to offer Cadillac plans.
1. Overview of Cadillac Tax
The excise tax applies to any “excess benefit” provided under “ap-
plicable employer-sponsored coverage.”200  Generally, a health plan
qualifies as “applicable employer-sponsored coverage” if the value of
coverage is excludable from the employee’s income under section 106
of the Internal Revenue Code.201  An “excess benefit” arises if the an-
nual cost of coverage exceeds $10,200, in the case of individual cover-
age, or $27,500, in the case of family coverage,202 multiplied by a
“health cost adjustment percentage.”203  The “health cost adjustment
percentage” increases the dollar limits to the extent that the 2018 per-
employee cost under the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard option
197. See supra section III.A.
198. See I.R.C. § 4980I (2006) (added by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, § 9001(a), 124 Stat. 119, 847 (2010), and amended by
PPACA § 10901, 124 Stat at 1015, and Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. 111-152, § 1401, 124 Stat. 1029, 1059).
199. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 7-4 (stating that the Cadillac tax “originated in the
broad consensus that the Code’s current tax treatment of employer-provided
medical care encourages overconsumption of medical services”); see also AM.
ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES & SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REFORM:
EXCISE TAX ON HIGH-COST EMPLOYER PLANS 9 (2010) (“One purpose of the excise
tax outlined in the PPACA is to raise revenue from insurance companies and plan
administrators.  Another purpose of the tax is to reduce health spending by tax-
ing a portion of the cost of comprehensive benefits, thereby making them a less
attractive form of compensation.”).
200. See I.R.C. § 4980I(a) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848).
201. I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(1)(A) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 850).
202. Coverage under a collectively bargained multiemployer plan is deemed to be fam-
ily coverage and thus always eligible for the higher limit.  I.R.C.
§ 4980I(b)(3)(B)(ii) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and amended by
HCERA § 1401(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1059).
203. I.R.C. § 4980I(b) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and amended by
HCERA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 1059).
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under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan exceeds the 2010
cost by more than 55%.204  After 2018, the dollar limits will be ad-
justed for inflation.205  The dollar limits are also adjusted for age and
gender206 and are increased for retirees and plans that primarily
cover employees in high-risk professions207 or employees who repair
or install electrical or telecommunications lines.208  The cost of cover-
age is to be determined under rules similar to those established under
COBRA.209
The excise tax is imposed on the “coverage provider.”210  In the
case of a group health plan, the coverage provider is the health insur-
ance issuer.211  In the case of health savings account (HSA)212 and
medical savings account (MSA)213 contributions, the employer is the
coverage provider.214  In all other instances, the coverage provider is
the person that administers the plan,215 which will often be the
employer.216
204. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(ii) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and
amended by HCERA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 1059).
205. I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(v) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and re-
designated by HCERA § 1401(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1059).  Initially, the limits
will increase at 1% over increases in the CPI.  After 2020, increases will be lim-
ited to increases in the CPI. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(c)(v) (added by PPACA
§ 9001, 124 Stat. at 848, and amended and re-designated by HCERA
§ 1401(a)(2)(C), (E), 124 Stat. at 1059–60).
206. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iii) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and
amended by HCERA § 1401(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1059).
207. High-risk professions are defined broadly to include law enforcement, fire protec-
tion, longshoremen, emergency medical technicians, construction, mining, agri-
culture, forestry, and fishing industries.  I.R.C. § 4980I(f)(3) (added by PPACA
§ 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 852, and amended by PPACA § 10901(a), 124 Stat. at
1015).
208. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iv) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 848, and
re-designated by HCERA § 1401(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1059).
209. See I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(2) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 851).
210. See I.R.C. § 4980I(c) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 849).
211. See I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(A) (added by PPACA § 9001(a), 124 Stat. at 849).
212. An HSA is a health savings account authorized by Section 223 of the Internal
Revenue Code.  I.R.C. § 223.  For a brief overview of HSAs, see FROLIK & MOORE,
supra note 61, at 123–24.
213. An MSA is an Archer medical savings account authorized by Section 220 of the
Internal Revenue Code.  Archer MSAs are functionally similar to HSAs but may
only be established by self-employed individuals and small employers. See Amy
B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80
TUL. L. REV. 777, 799 & n.131 (2006)
214. See I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(B) (added by PPACA § 9001, 124 Stat. at 849).
215. See I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(C) (added by PPACA § 9001, 124 Stat. at 849).
216. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 7-5 (noting that the employer sponsoring the plan
will often be the plan administrator).
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2. Likely Effect
The CBO estimates that employers will pay Cadillac excise taxes of
$12 billion in 2018 and $20 billion in 2019.217  The CBO, however,
does not estimate how many employers will change their plans in or-
der to avoid the tax.218
According to a Mercer survey of about 800 employers, of all the
elements of PPACA, employers are most concerned about the “Cadil-
lac” tax.219  Based on its extensive research and client experience,
Towers Watson estimates that the excise tax could hit as many of 60%
of employers if current trends continue.220
If the Cadillac tax goes into effect as scheduled, then it will likely
cause many employers to change the terms of their plans.  According
to a survey by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit
Plans, close to half of respondents are focusing on redesigning their
health plans to avoid the excise tax for Cadillac plans.221  Towers
Watson has identified “[p]rogram design, including the use of
CDHPs222 and other strategies to drive continued improvement in
workforce health [as] some of the tools employers are likely to use to
keep costs at or below the medical cost component of the Consumer
Price Index.”223  PricewaterhouseCoopers has suggested employers
consider increasing cost sharing, reducing benefits, and moving to
more tightly managed care as possible strategies to trim benefit costs
in order to avoid the Cadillac tax.224
217. CBO, supra note 159, at tbl.2.
218. Since the concept of the Cadillac tax is relatively new and there is limited data
available to analyze its likely effect, perhaps this is not surprising. Cf. AM. ACAD-
EMY OF ACTUARIES & SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, supra note 199, at 4–7 (providing reve-
nue estimates for the Cadillac tax as originally introduced but recognizing the
tentative nature of estimates).
219. See MERCER, supra note 119, at 2 (“A recent Mercer survey of 791 employers
found that the excise tax was their most significant concern, followed by changes
to lifetime limits and dependent eligibility.”).
220. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 133, at 5.  Nevertheless, Towers Watson reports
that 43% of employers with medical plans for active employees report believing
they would be subject to the excise tax. Id.; cf. Kushner, supra note 142, at 39
(stating that it would seem that few employers would initially be impacted by the
Cadillac tax because average health plan costs for most employers are signifi-
cantly below the applicable thresholds today).
221. IFEBP, supra note 50, at 33.
222. CDHPs are consumer-driven health care plans.  For an overview of CDHPs, see
FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 61, at 122–24.
223. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 133, at 7.
224. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ HEALTH RESEARCH INST., BEHIND THE NUMBERS:
MEDICAL COST TRENDS FOR 2011, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.areadevel-
opment.com/article_pdf/id36630_PwCHealthCosts.pdf.  The American Academy
of Actuaries and Society of Actuaries identified the following possible methods to
reduce costs to avoid the tax: (1) enrollee cost-sharing increases, such as co-pay-
ments, deductibles, co-insurance, and benefit limits; (2) reduction in covered ben-
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Shortly after the excise tax was first introduced in November 2009
(with an earlier effective date and lower thresholds),225 Mercer sur-
veyed 465 employer health plan sponsors about how they would likely
respond to such a tax.226  Nearly two-thirds (63%) of the respondents
said they would reduce covered benefits to avoid paying the tax.227  Of
those who would reduce benefits, 75% said they would raise deduct-
ibles and co-pays, 40% said they would add an alternative low-cost
plan to their benefit offerings, and 32% said they would replace their
current plan with a low-cost option.228  Many of the larger employers
reported that they would seek to lower costs through more sophisti-
cated strategies.229  For example, 25% of employers with workforces of
5000 or more employees said “they would seek quality and cost-effi-
ciency improvements through high-performance networks, medical
homes, and health management incentives.”230  The largest employers
were also the most likely to report that they would terminate em-
ployer contributions to flexible health spending, health reimburse-
ment, and health spending accounts.231
Thus, based on survey data, it appears likely that many employers
will change their health plans in order to avoid the Cadillac tax.  Of
course, it is quite possible that the Cadillac tax will be repealed before
it ever goes into effect.  The excise tax was initially scheduled to take
effect in 2013.232  The PPACA’s sidecar reconciliation bill extended
the effective date until 2018.233  As Edward Zelinsky has noted, “four
elections, including the congressional election of 2014 and the presi-
dential election of 2016, will take place before this levy goes into ef-
fect.”234  The levy’s long-delayed effective date235 suggests that the
Cadillac tax carries a “high[ ] level of political toxicity,” and “[i]t is
efits; or (3) elimination of high-cost plans. AM. ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES & SOC’Y
OF ACTUARIES, supra note 199, at 13.
225. Initially, the excise tax was scheduled to take effect in 2013 and was designed to
apply to employee-only coverage at or above $8500 and family coverage at or
above $23,000.  Press Release, Mercer, Majority of Employers Would Reduce







231. Some 25% of employers with 5000 or more employers said they would terminate
such contributions, compared to 19% of employers of all sizes. Id.
232. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148,
§ 9001(c), 124 Stat. 119, 853 (2010).
233. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. 111-
152, § 1401(b), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060.
234. Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 7-24.
235. Many of the other provisions of PPACA have delayed effective dates.  Yet, the
Cadillac tax’s effective date is delayed the longest. See id.
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unlikely that officeholders running for re-election in 2018 will em-
brace a different political calculus than did their peers in 2010.  Hence
the prognosis for the tax on ‘Cadillac’ plans is at best uncertain.”236
V. CONCLUSION
Health care in the United States has long been financed princi-
pally through employment-based health insurance.  At least in the
short run, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is unlikely
to disturb that balance.
PPACA’s three incentives with respect to employment-based
health insurance are unlikely to change significantly the number of
employers who elect to offer employment-based health insurance.  The
penalty under the large employer pay-or-play mandate, though low
relative to the cost of health insurance premiums, is unlikely to affect
employers’ willingness to offer health insurance, at least in the short
run.  The small employer tax credit may encourage some employers
that do not already offer health insurance to offer health insurance.  It
is not clear, however, how many employers will elect to claim the
credit.  At most, only about 4 million small employers would be eligi-
ble to claim the small employer tax credit, and many—though cer-
tainly not all—of those small employers currently offer health
insurance.  Thus, the small employer tax credit may increase some-
what the number of small employers that offer health insurance, but
it is unlikely to have significant impact on the total number of employ-
ers that offer health insurance. Of the three incentives, the Cadillac
tax is likely to have the greatest impact on employers’ behavior.  Sur-
vey data suggests that many employers will likely change the terms of
their plans in order to avoid the excise tax.  Nevertheless, it is quite
possible that the tax will be repealed before it ever goes into effect.
Projections by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) confirm that the
number of individuals covered by employment-based health insurance
is not expected to change significantly as a result of PPACA.  The
CMS estimates that the number of individuals enrolled in employer-
sponsored health care plans will decline modestly, from 165.9 million
in 2010 to 164.5 million in 2019, as a result of the enactment of
PPACA.237  The CBO projects that the number of individuals covered
by employer-sponsored health plans will increase from 150 million in
2010 to 162 million in 2019 as a result of PPACA,238 but it expects the
236. Id. at 7-25
237. FOSTER, supra note 159, at 3.
238. See CBO, supra note 159, at tbl.4.
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total number covered in 2019 to be 3 million less than would have
been covered had PPACA not gone into effect.239
Although these absolute numbers mask a fair bit of churning,240
this churning is not attributable to PPACA’s employer pay-or-play
mandate, small employer tax credit, or Cadillac excise tax.  Instead, it
is due to other changes wrought by PPACA, such as the individual
mandate and the requirement that dependent care coverage be ex-
tended to age twenty-six.241  If PPACA ultimately does fundamentally
reform employment-based health insurance in this country, it will be
indirectly through its substantive regulation of health care, rather
than directly through the specific incentives it creates in the form of
the pay-or-play mandate, small employer tax credit, and Cadillac ex-
cise tax.
239. Id. at 10 & tbl.4.
240. See Hyman, supra note 11, at 13 (“Although the estimated number of Americans
receiving [employment-based health insurance] is projected by CMS to stay al-
most exactly the same, there is considerable churn underneath the picture of
placid stasis.”).  Specifically, the CMS projects that by 2019, an additional 13 mil-
lion workers and family members will become newly covered by employer-spon-
sored plans as a result of additional employers offering health coverage, a higher
percentage of employees electing to enroll in employer-sponsored plans, and
PPACA’s mandate that employer-sponsored plans extend dependent coverage up
to age twenty-six. FOSTER, supra note 159, at 7.  Meanwhile, the CMS projects
that 2 million workers currently covered by employer-sponsored plans will be-
come eligible for Medicaid and another 12 million workers will replace employer-
sponsored health insurance with subsidized coverage through the exchanges.  Id.
at 6–7.  Similarly, the CBO projects that 6 to 7 million new people would be cov-
ered under PPACA, largely because the individual mandate would increase work-
ers’ demand for employment-based coverage.  CBO, supra note 159, at 10.  The
CBO further projects that 8 to 9 million individuals who would be covered under
current law would not be offered coverage under PPACA.  Id.  The CBO expects
that the firms that would not offer coverage to be smaller employers and employ-
ers with predominantly low-paid workforces. Id.  Finally, the CBO projects that
between 1 million and 2 million people who would be covered under an employer-
sponsored plan under current law would instead choose to obtain coverage
through an exchange. Id.
241. The Rand Corporation’s Comprehensive Assessment of Reform Efforts (COM-
PARE) microsimulation model predicts that PPACA will increase the number of
workers offered employment-based health insurance coverage from 115.1 million
to 136 million.  Christine Eibner et al., The Effects of the Affordable Care Act on
Workers’ Health Insurance Coverage, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1393, 1394 (2010).
Like the CBO and CMS, Rand does not attribute this increase to PPACA’s em-
ployer pay-or-play mandate, small employer tax credit, or Cadillac excise tax.
See id. at 1394–95.  Instead, it credits PPACA’s individual mandate and the
availability of new, often lower-cost insurance options for small businesses
through the exchanges. Id.
